新聞內文「野村證券近日發出警告，中國經濟基本面可能會顯著惡化，下半年需求恐將出現「斷崖式下跌」。」
如果一定要看分析師評論中國的言論，各間基金公司或是投信都會有，只是多數都非常不準，而且感覺都是大（出）外（貨）宣（文）。不過如果一定要看，那麼一定要把野村放在前面。
當然野村會有各種不同守備範圍的分析師在發表看法，不過整體的內涵，平均是高的。
在去年第四季的時候，野村其實把今年度中國的GDP成長平均定在4.5 %以上，其中第一季最高年增率是5%，第二季大概會降成4.8%，然後依序下降，直到全年度平均年增率為4.5%，而且這是上調後的結果。
之所以上調，就是因為去年第四季中國有推出寬鬆政策，的確看起來有帶來一些成效。
不過今年以來有看到什麼樣的重大貨幣政策嗎？
其實還沒有。
好，回過頭來說，這則新聞裡面其實講到的重點是，中國上半年的狀況不錯，是因為美國的關稅制裁導致出口拉貨上升。
如果我們從中國統計局的公布資料來看，中國整體出口上升7.2%，對美國其實是下滑16%的，那出口去哪裡了？
是東協還有非洲。
中國對東協出口年增率成長是6.8 %，對非洲也成長了34.8%，看起來全世界的消費中心應該是移到東協跟非洲沒錯吧？
當然是錯的，這就是洗產地。所以為什麼新聞傳出來越南本來跟美國談好了低關稅，結果後來被調高成20 %，其他東南亞的國家也普遍在25%到35 %之間。
中國對越南出口也增加了30 %以上，所以我實在不明白有什麼好氣被美國調高關稅？
好，總之，中國的確是洗產地，也的確緊急拉貨，但是在東南亞這些國家關稅大致底定之後，如果不想後續被美國調關稅，洗產地勢必行不通，那麼後續的出口還可以增加多少？那就不好說。
所以才會有分析師所說的，下半年可能會有斷崖式的下跌。
不過斷崖式的下跌不代表股市不會漲，高機率會有反彈。
（但那不代表一定會反彈到什麼地步，有可能超過、也有可能還沒有到，然後反彈就如曇花一現，啪，沒了）
所以中國接下來應該最正確的做法就是能夠放寬多少貨幣政策就放寬，先維穩房地產，才有助把消費者的信心拉回來。
至於為什麼必須先從房地產下手，可以看一下這張圖，大部分中國的重點城市從2018或是2021年，房價都普遍下跌30 %以上，人們最大的資產都卡在房地產，還有什麼心情做其他的消費呢？
新聞報的比較多，都是電動車甚至是家電的補助，其實中國最需要的應該是先把房地產「維穩」。
要知道，人們這一輩子最大的一筆花費就是買房子，畢竟婚姻來都來了。而且只能來一次。
如果房地產的價格是會下跌的，今年買不如明年買，明年買不如後年買，後年買不如不要買；預售屋還沒蓋好，但已經繳的，乾脆就讓它變成溺水屋，丟給銀行去處理算了。
以台灣來說，基本上房價下跌的時候，大概就是馬英九任內2015前後那兩年最糟，不過後續房價就開始往上漲；但是中國從2021年來看，下跌五成房價的大有人在，更不要說後續可能還看不到盡頭。
房價如果不要動，而利率成本上升，大家捏著………….LP，還是會繼續繳房貸，頂多消費減少一咪咪；但是如果房價是下跌的，不要說房貸繳的心不乾情不願，連一般民生消費都沒有心情了。基本上就是慢性中毒。
但是房地產不好救，所以能夠先騙騙大家做一些簡單的消費支出，來維持民生產業的動能或是重點扶植產業還是有機會。所以才會會有一堆什麼家電補貼，電動車補貼等等。
只是除了房地產的其他方面，大概都不太有機會穩住，對美國的態度也不可能放軟，高機率只能硬著頭皮洗下去，能夠維持基本心跳已經是萬幸。
不過對中國還要滿懷希望，任何國家跟中國對抗必定粉身碎骨，這點勞者不會懷疑，也請大家不要懷疑。
畢竟中國有第一美男子習主席在任。
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Read the News: Will China’s Demand Plummet in the Second Half of the Year?
News Excerpt: “Nomura Securities recently issued a warning that China’s economic fundamentals may significantly deteriorate, with demand potentially facing a ‘cliff-like drop’ in the second half of the year.”
Link in the comments.
If you must follow analysts’ commentary on China, every fund or investment company has some, but most are highly inaccurate and feel like overhyped PR pieces. However, if you must read them, always prioritize Nomura.
Nomura has analysts covering various sectors, and overall, their insights are of high quality.
In the fourth quarter of last year, Nomura actually raised its forecast for China’s GDP growth this year to an average of 4.5% or higher. The first quarter was projected to peak at 5% year-on-year, dropping to about 4.8% in the second quarter, and gradually declining thereafter, averaging 4.5% for the full year.
The upward revision was due to China’s stimulus policies in Q4 last year, which did show some positive effects.
But have we seen any significant monetary policy moves this year? Not really.
Now, back to the news. The key point is that China’s strong performance in the first half was driven by increased exports due to U.S. tariff sanctions.
According to data from China’s National Bureau of Statistics, overall exports rose by 7.2%, but exports to the U.S. dropped by 16%. So, where did the exports go?
To ASEAN and Africa.
China’s export growth to ASEAN was 6.8%, and to Africa, a whopping 34.8%. Does this mean the global consumption hub has shifted to ASEAN and Africa?
Of course not. This is about “origin laundering.” That’s why Vietnam, which initially secured low tariffs with the U.S., later saw them raised to 20%, with other Southeast Asian countries facing tariffs between 25% and 35%.
China’s exports to Vietnam also surged by over 30%. So, why complain about the U.S. raising tariffs?
In short, China is indeed engaging in origin laundering and rushing exports. But once tariffs in Southeast Asia stabilize, if they want to avoid further U.S. tariff hikes, origin laundering won’t work anymore. How much exports can grow after that is uncertain.
This is why analysts predict a potential “cliff-like drop” in demand in the second half.
However, a cliff-like drop doesn’t mean the stock market won’t rise. I briefly mentioned this in a senior-year class.
(But that doesn’t mean it will definitely rebound to a certain level—it could overshoot, or it might not even reach that point before fizzling out like a fleeting spark.)
So, what should China do next? Ideally, it should loosen monetary policy as much as possible to stabilize the real estate market first, which would help restore consumer confidence.
Why focus on real estate? Look at this chart: since 2018 or 2021, housing prices in most major Chinese cities have fallen by over 30%. People’s largest asset is tied up in real estate—how can they feel like spending on anything else?
The news often highlights subsidies for electric vehicles or appliances, but what China really needs is to stabilize real estate.
After all, a house is the biggest purchase most people make in their lifetime—especially since marriage only happens once.
If housing prices are falling, why buy this year when next year is cheaper? Or the year after? Or maybe not at all? For pre-sale homes not yet built but already paid for, some might just let them become “underwater” and leave them to the banks.
In Taiwan, the worst period for falling housing prices was around 2015 during Ma Ying-jeou’s term, but prices started rising afterward. In China, since 2021, some have seen housing prices drop by 50%, with no end in sight.
If housing prices stay flat while interest rates rise, people might grumble but still pay their mortgages, cutting back slightly on spending. But if prices are falling, not only do they pay mortgages reluctantly, they lose the mood for everyday consumption. It’s like slow poisoning.
Saving real estate is tough, so encouraging small consumer spending to maintain momentum in key industries or support priority sectors is still a chance. That’s why there are subsidies for appliances, electric vehicles, and so on.
But aside from real estate, other sectors are unlikely to stabilize. China’s stance toward the U.S. won’t soften either, so it’s likely to keep pushing forward, barely maintaining a basic pulse.
